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The Phenomenal-Dialectic Personality Model: A Frame of Reference for the Psychodramatist

LENI M. F. VERHOFSTADT-DENÈVE

ABSTRACT. A phenomenal-dialectic model of personality that has emerged from developmental and practical theories of psychology and psychodrama is outlined. The phenomenal aspect is based on subjective potentialities and restrictions in the construction of the self; the dialectic refers to an underlying dynamic process that enables the individual to change qualitatively through a constantly renewing series of crises. Various aspects of the self are discussed in detail, and an attempt is made to show how the different dimensions of the personality model can be used in psychodrama.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH the tradition of dialectic development psychology (Riegel, 1979; Buss, 1979), I feel convinced that every form of qualitative personality development relies on the action of dialectic processes (Verhofstadt-Denève, 1980, 1982, 1985). As we know, the experience of contrasts serves as the basis of the dialectic process. What is important is to operationalize those contrasts active in the process. An attempt to do so is made in the construction of the phenomenal-dialectic personality model.

Structure of the Personality Model

As a starting point, I will take the human potential for self-reflection or self-transcendence, which has been given convincing emphasis in the personological and existential traditions. The personological tradition is represented by such psychologists and sociologists as William James, George Herbert Mead, Charles Horton Cooley, Gordon Allport, Erving Goffman, G. A. Kelly, and Erik Erikson; the existential by philosophers Blaise Pascal, Søren Kierkegaard, Albert Camus, and John Paul Sartre; and the existential psychology approach by the work of Europeans Lud-

wig Binswanger and Medard Boss, Victor Frankl, Otto Friedrich Bollnow, Anne-Lise Løvlie and Americans Ulrich Sonnemam, Paul Tillich, and Rollo May. Comparable notions can also be found in Lewis and Brooks (1978) and Hermans (1987). Often, the self (compare the person) is referred to as "I-me relation."

Man, the giver of meaning, is able to achieve critical reflection upon himself in his world; moreover, he is aware of this self-reflective potential. This gives rise to what May (1983) calls the "human dilemma": Man can simultaneously consider himself an observing subject and an observed object—observed by himself and by others. Along analogous lines, I assume the *person* to be a dynamically developing relation between the *I* and the *me* (Figure 1). In the main, the person is a process between two interdependent (not to be separated) poles:

The I is the subject pole, the person as knower;
The me is the object pole, the person as known.


The I is the thinking, feeling, willing, acting, observing, and evaluating component in the person (James, 1890, 1892; Hermans, 1987). It is the I that experiences, reflects, organizes, selects, and integrates, mainly in terms of self-actualization, of self-esteem, and of recognition by significant others. Therefore, the I is more process than content. Mead (1934) has coined the phrase "the experiencing self." In some respects, because of its organizing function, the I can be compared with the ego of Freud and the ego (organizing) plus I (reflecting) of Erikson (1968). The me is defined by the category of "being observed." It is the system of meaning resulting from reflection by the I.

By way of the I-me reflection, a number of phenomenal self-constructions are created. The term *phenomenal* here refers to the subjective directness of the I reflection upon the me. The term *self-construction* should be understood as a wider concept than the mere product of the reflection upon oneself. The term also comprises interpretation of the social world and the object world because they are personal creations. Meanings and interpretations that I confer upon the outside world are part of my person, of the me. Along with the creation (the giving of meaning) of my world, I create myself. The properties that I attribute to my friend are essentially my own. If my friend disappears, I mourn for that part of myself that I have lost through his departure. In a phenomenal view pushed to extremes, there is no distinction between the person and his environment because every subject creates his own (social and material) world of meanings. In such a one-world view, subjective interpretations are the only existing reality.

Though I accept most phenomenological positions, I believe that this

FIGURE 1.

PHENOMENAL - DIALECTIC PERSONALITY MODEL



narrow one-world view, if taken in the strictest sense, neglects a major part of reality. It is a view that makes inadequate allowance for certain personal contents and conditions that are undeniably present but that may act unconsciously, or for contents that a person does not know (possibly only for the time being) but that may contribute to defining him in a decisive way. A complete personality model must take these possibilities into account.

In the sometimes chaotic multiplicity of self- and world-interpretations that can be constructed by the I-me reflection, I distinguish the following diagram of six self-constructions or self-dimensions, each of them corresponding to a central question (Figure 1).

Self-image	Who am I?
Ideal-self	Who would I like to be?
Alter-image	What are the others like?
Ideal-alter	What should the others be like?
Meta-self	How do the others perceive me?
Ideal-meta-self	How should the others perceive me?

The Self-image

The inquiry after my self-image bears not only on psychic and physical *personal characteristics* and various roles that I play at the same time (which are sometimes hard to reconcile), but also on the existential social and material *conditions* in which I live. The conditions are part of myself. I (may) know (among others) that, as a man or a woman, I exist (accidentally?), here and now in this world, born of these (great-grand-) parents, in this particular family, and in this particular social context, and that I shall no longer be (physically) present within a measurable space of time (10, 30, 60, certainly within 100 years).

In addition, all the groups and people to whom I relate in one way or another are part of my self-image. "I am X, with such and such relationships in such and such fields. . . ." A very special place is assumed by those people whom I construe (or have construed) as important others (see Mead's "significant others" and Kelly, 1955, "social role constructs"). What persons in my environment do I perceive in the role of mother, father, sister, partner, etc.? The core question in the self-image is therefore not primarily "what are the others like?" but rather "who am I in relation to the others? What do the others mean to *me*?" This could be called a *self-reflecting approach* to the others.

My self-image comprises not only my view of my *past* and my *present* personal characteristics and conditions, but also my perception of the person that I think (fear) I shall become *later* and of the situations in

which I shall presumably find myself. This future image may deviate from the image desired. I shall deal with the desired image when discussing the ideal-self.

In the self-image, a further important point is the view of the *inner* (real) self and the *outer* form under which it appears; that is, the content and the structure by means of which, at a given moment, we present ourselves to the others in terms of positive evaluation (the "divided self" in Laing, 1972). Sharp contrasts may be involved here. Some people are very skillful in impression management techniques that hide their inner selves; they are not in the least bothered by these contrasts. Others find the contradiction between inner and outer self-image hard to bear. They aim to be their (honest) selves as much as possible and to present themselves to others as they are. Snyder (1979) describes them as "high and low self-monitoring" types.

So far I have dealt only with those aspects of the self-image that I am conscious of at a given moment (zone A in Figure 1). One need not necessarily be a "blinded" Freudian (Canetti, 1936) to consider the decisive significance of unconscious components to be fundamental. Naturally I understand unconscious as different from nonconscious. The unconscious is essentially different from a purely cognitive nongrasping at a given level of consciousness. Some characteristics and conditions endangering positive recognition and appreciation by ourselves and by others can be ignored. Without our being aware of it, the I can use various techniques (compare defense mechanisms) to avoid such embarrassing confrontations. One such technique, for example, is the attribution to others of content elements that one has unconsciously marked as negative. Hence, the I can operate at the unconscious level as well.

The *phenomenal self-image* refers to the whole of conscious and unconscious personal characteristics and conditions that the I, through reflection upon the me, attributes to its own person (Figure 1, the phenomenal zone D). This subjective self-construction, however, may comprise "erroneous" interpretations and may be flawed by serious gaps.

For example, somebody may be so firmly convinced that he does not usually assert himself fully in very divergent situations that he thinks he is, as a rule, given fewer opportunities than others. Such a person, who thinks of himself as indulgent, may, on the contrary, prove to be somebody who often fights back strongly. Similarly, there are a great number of characteristics and conditions that we mark as positive or negative and that we think we can perceive in ourselves but that do not correspond to any reality. These presumptive, though erroneously interpreted, content elements belong to the erroneous zone of phenomenal self-construction (C in Figure 1). The label erroneous could be used when there is a striking

contrast between the perception that a person has of his behavior and the behavior that he displays. Obviously, there are no strict criteria for judging interpretations to be correct or erroneous, particularly in cases such as those discussed here that involve nonphysical content elements. The only standard of comparison is probably the perception that “most others” have—the social consensus. This is a very subjective reality, determined in a very high degree by historical, cultural, and social traditions.

I believe there is no such thing as an absolute standard of reality. On the other hand, “reality” is certainly larger than the individual subjective interpretation propounded by the fullest phenomenological view. It is of paramount importance that we always make allowance for the relativity of the subjective view. The concept of a zone of error introduces a dynamic accent in that it contains a possibility of flexible interpretation. Moreover, every interpretation is valid for only one single moment. Thus, the “not very indulgent person” may, through signals from others, tend to become more lenient after some time, so that his behavior will increasingly overlap with the perception he has of himself as an “indulgent” person.

In addition to the erroneous interpretation of myself and of my material and social world, there are also the hypothetical characteristics and conditions upon which I cannot reflect because I do not yet know them (zone E in Figure 1). Contents that are unknown are fundamentally different from contents that are unconscious. *Unknown* contents are those I do not “know.” I have not (yet) been faced with them at whatever level of consciousness. *Unconscious* contents are those that I may not want to know but that are certainly present in the deeper levels of consciousness of my person. Unconscious contents are dynamic forces that intrinsically determine our behavior in an important degree. The influence of unknown contents, too, can be decisive, but fundamentally they remain an external influence. In essence, these contents are not part of myself. Yet they can be of enormous significance for a person’s development. So can certain talents or deficiencies that I do not suspect in myself or ecological factors that, without my knowing, may either threaten my health or be beneficial.

Therefore, I distinguish the phenomenal self-construction (zone D) from the hypothetical real self (zone F). This view implies that the real self, unlike the self-construction, does not comprise any hypothetical erroneous contents. On the contrary, it does comprise the characteristics and conditions that are unknown to me.

To the five remaining phenomenal self-constructions (Figure 1), a basic structure similar to that of the self-image applies. Personal characteristics and (existential) conditions can be distinguished; all five comprise

past, present, and future contents; the five images also contain outer forms of appearance and inner aspects of self; the contents act at both the conscious and the unconscious levels; for each of the phenomenal constructions, there is a hypothetical "real" or "ideal" situation.

I will now deal with these five phenomenal images and their hypothetical real or ideal contents, though the discussion will of necessity be brief.

The Ideal-self

Who would I like to be, who could I become, allowing for my deficiencies and given my potentialities, and taking into account the inescapable material, social, and existential conditions in which I live? Obviously, the entire system of values is of fundamental importance, both for the evaluation of the self-image and for the direct construction of the ideal-self.

On the analogy of the erroneous zone in the self-image, an "unrealistic" zone can be discerned in the ideal-self (zone c). Unrealistic here refers to aspirations that cannot be accomplished, given the real situation and optimal potentialities of development.

Zone e, the unknown zone, comprises characteristics and conditions that I could fulfill if circumstances were ideal, but that I am not aware of; I cannot, therefore, pursue them, even at the unconscious level. Thanks to a sensitive partner, a friend, a therapeutic session, a chance meeting, these potentialities can be revealed to me and become part of my goals.

The "totality of personal aspirations" (zone d) and, in particular, the "hypothetically ideal situation" (zone f) are hypothetical constructions of the positive, utopian kind. Zone f does correspond with a reality in principle, but it is a reality that can never be fully achieved. For a given person, it would imply the full actualization of all his potentialities in ideal conditions. In such a case, the phenomenal ideal-self and the hypothetical ideal situation would overlap completely. This is utterly impossible, however, and within the present framework, it is not even desirable (Verhofstadt-Denève, 1985, 1987).

The Alter-image

In building up my self-image, I have concurrently developed a particular conception of the others—ultimately they are "the others in me," hence the term alter-image.

The others are present in the self-image as well, though rather from a *reflective* point of view. Who am I in relation to the others? What relationships have I entered into? The alter-image, on the contrary, refers to

an approach to the social environment. What are the others like? Who are they going to become? What roles do they play? What are their standards? What have they accomplished? In what social, material, and existential conditions do they live? All these questions primarily constitute an attempt to know and understand the inner alter-image. In addition, the question of the connection between the inner and outer alter-image is raised. "Does he present himself the way he really is, the way he really thinks and feels?"

Developing the alter-image is a rather laborious undertaking. It is influenced by the relationships that one has experienced with (significant) others. Each of us construes the people in our environment in a very personal way, thus creating ourself. A telling example given by Becker (in Løvlie, 1982, p. 20) helps illustrate the point.

A high school boy wants to develop a relationship to a girl in his class-room. He acts towards her—asks her for a date, sits next to her at a football game, etc. . . . Now, as the boy acts—he *creates* her. If he is extremely timid, he may create *her* as brazen. If he is demanding, he may create her as "not worth it," "hard to get." . . . More often than not, he will fail to see that *her qualities as a person are in part determined by his actions*. In that way another boy may end up with a totally different picture of the same girl. . . . A very important contribution of the dialectic view is that as *he creates her*, *he creates himself*. He creates himself as a heterosexual self.

It is important to note that in developing one's alter-image, empathy can enable one to enter into the life of the others, "taking the role of the other," in Mead's words. This is a potentiality that will grow very gradually during childhood and adolescence (Selman, 1980; Damon & Hart, 1982).

Our phenomenal construction of the others, just like the construction of the self-image, harbors unconscious contents (zone B). They are fundamental elements in the way we construe the others, but we ignore these contents. Often they are positive characteristics or conditions that we do not like to concede to the others because we think we cannot take pride in ourselves for having them. They may also be negative contents that do not fit into the positive image we have construed of the others and that we need for the positive evaluation of our own image. This is typical of a love situation.

In addition to unconscious contents, there are also erroneous perceptions of the others (zone C). They are characteristics and conditions that we attribute to others but that do not conform to reality. The contents wrongly attributed by my I to the others may arise from unconscious, undesired characteristics or conditions in my own self-image (Løvlie, 1982a, 1982b). Finally, just as in the case of the self-image, there are real characteristics and conditions of the others—roles that they play of which we are not aware at any level of consciousness (zone E).

The Ideal-alter

The image we have of the others, or what they are like, what they were like, and what we feel they are likely to become, has a dialectic relation to the ideal-alter. It is a phenomenal construction of what the others should be like and should become.

We admire certain characteristics and conditions of the others. Some characteristics and conditions we appreciate much less, and we may utterly condemn other characteristics and conditions. Concurrently with this evaluation, we also conceive an image of what the others should or could be like and in what situations they should or could live (zone d). Unconscious (zone b) and unrealistic (zone c) desires are at play here as well, just as for the ideal-self. Again, our image of how the others should and could ideally be is incomplete (zone e). We do not know all the potentialities and limitations of the others, and we cannot possibly grasp their hypothetically ideal development (zone f).

The ideal-image that I construe of the others relates not only to my alter-image, but also to my self-image and my ideal-self-image. Thus, we sometimes construe the others to be as we had wished ourselves to be. Parents, for example, may attempt to see the opportunities that they missed realized in their children. Obviously, a more egoistic approach also occurs frequently. It is one in which we hope that the others (parents, partners, employers, colleagues) have (or develop) the characteristics that we hope will not hamper our own development but, indeed, will stimulate it.

The Meta-self

At the same time I develop an image of what the others are likely to be (alter-image), I also build hypotheses about how the others perceive me. Therefore, the construction of the meta-self is closely interwoven with my potentiality for empathic role taking, that is, entering into the world of the others. The totality of the self-image is ultimately thought to be a reflection or mirror-image of the meta-self, according to Goffman (1978), Cooley (1902, 1978), and Mead (1934, 1964).

Though it may be true that others' perception of ourselves is very important to the construction of our self-image, I still believe that some authors go too far in presenting the meta-self as the all-decisive factor for the self-image. Admittedly, hopeful expectations nourished by others do play a major role in the construction of our self-image; a negative approach by others may also constitute a challenge to surpass the former self and make an extra effort, especially if some significant others have

given a positive content to the meta-self. It is very probable that in the meta-self, unconscious contents, erroneous contents (characteristics wrongly supposed to be ascribed by others to us), and unknown contents (characteristics that the others attribute to us without our being aware of them) are at work.

As with other dimensions of the person, the meta-self is not a static given. It is in constant evolution, depending on our age, on the various (status) roles we play, and on the varying relationships we enter into. We consider the judgment of people whom we assume know us very well, or whom we see as significant others at a given moment, particularly decisive. A friendship relation is often evaluated from the meta-self, though without our being clearly aware of it. The subjective feeling that "my relationship is deepening, is growing more honest and more dynamic" is usually to be taken to mean "our mutual perception is one of positive evaluation, he finds me valuable such as I am." Self-confidence and faith in one's own potential thus acquire indispensable support. The result is that the negative evaluations that one has experienced in other respects will be tackled more actively and more dynamically.

In the confrontation between the self-image and the meta-self, it may happen that the meta-self is experienced as out of reach, as unattainable. "Some people expect too much of me; I cannot possibly live up to their expectations." Instead of being stimulative, an overexacting meta-self may arouse anxiety and uncertainty. One should note, however, that a distinction must be made between the subjective feeling of contrast at a given moment (a situation that may be experienced as very unpleasant or even as a crisis), and the positive effect that such a crisis has on the developmental process. It is not until the crisis has abated that I can appreciate its positive aspects. For example, the stiff demands that the others place on me may have stimulated me to actualize hitherto unsuspected potentialities (Verhofstadt-Denève 1980, 1982, 1985).

If I find the meta-self too exacting, I may, on the other hand, also feel that the others underrate me. Things can be even more difficult if my own evaluation of myself is negative and if such a negative meta-self shows a high degree of consistency in my social relationships. This isolation can entail very critical situations, triggering suicide.

The Ideal Meta-self

How would I like others to perceive me, now and in the future? What image of me should they have had? These are questions with respect to the ideal meta-self.

According to Goffman (1978), we are like actors who, by means of a

form of self-presentation, continually aim to make a “good” impression (that is, the impression we wish to make) on the various persons with whom we deal. Here again we can refer to the distinction Snyder (1979) makes between high and low self-monitoring subjects.

At first sight, this subdivision of the me into six different dimensions may appear to be artificial. My psychodrama practice, however, has clearly shown these contents to match genuine personality fields, which can serve as the infrastructure that psychodrama can work with fairly systematically. The next section will try to illustrate the connection between this personality model and its potential for application in psychodrama.

Application of the Personality Model in Psychodrama

The examples presented here do not describe an actual psychodramatic session. Their purpose is to illustrate, as systematically as possible, how the contents of the personality model can be approached by means of psychodrama techniques. For a survey of stages in psychodrama, basic elements and techniques applied, see Moreno (1959, 1970), J. L. Moreno and Z. T. Zoreno (1969), Blatner (1973), and Leveton (1977).

In this illustration, the protagonist is Peter, an adolescent who cannot get along with his father with whom he feels talking is not possible. Others are the director; codirector; antagonist, played by John, a member of the psychodrama group in the role of Peter’s father; and the auxiliary ego, in this case Mark, a member of the group who plays Peter’s “ideal father.” After each exchange, the psychodramatic technique in use is shown in bold-face type, the dimension in the personality model is in bold italics.

DIRECTOR (to protagonist): Can you tell us of a situation in which this problem emerges? **Concretization**

PROTAGONIST: Well, the other day I was in my room and Dad comes in, and begins to curse at me, and to call me names, says I’m lazy, I don’t work enough, I spend my pocket money too easily. A flaming row! ***Self-image (condition)***

DIRECTOR: Take somebody in the group who will play your father. (Peter chooses John.) ***Introduction of antagonist***

DIRECTOR (to Peter): Go and stand behind your father. Put your hand on his shoulder, become your father, and tell us, in the first person, who you are. **Warm up of the antagonist**

PROTAGONIST: I am Peter’s father. I run a small ready-to-wear business.

I have to work hard, and so has my wife. I have three children. Peter is the eldest and I also have two daughters. I married when I was 18—too young, really, but Peter was on his way. *Alter-image*

I sometimes wonder if he felt welcome, but I never discussed that with him. *Alter-image (outer/inner)*

DIRECTOR (to Peter as his father): What do you think of Peter? **Question asked of protagonist as antagonist**

PROTAGONIST (as his father): Peter is my only son, my eldest child. To be sure, my two girls are nice, but a son is something else again. He's bright enough, but he doesn't like working. I'd like him to run the business later. But he isn't a man yet. *Meta-self*

DIRECTOR: Does Peter tell you about what's going on inside him?

PROTAGONIST (as his father): Not enough, really. Sometimes he is very rude to me. Though I know he is very sensitive, he doesn't dare show his soft side. *Meta-self (outer/inner)*

DIRECTOR (to Peter in his role as his father): Be Peter again. Be yourself again. **Deroling**

DIRECTOR (to Peter as his own self): You're Peter again. How do you feel now?

PROTAGONIST: I'd rather be myself than my father. I feel better now, quieter. *Self-image (personal characteristic)*

DIRECTOR (to Peter): You do not seem to be entirely happy about your father's attitude. You now have an opportunity of finding what your "ideal father" looks like. Choose somebody from the group to represent him. (Peter chooses Mark.) **Working with "surplus reality"; introduction of auxiliary ego**

DIRECTOR (to Peter): Go and stand behind Mark. Become Peter's ideal father. Tell us in the first person who you are. **Warm up of auxiliary ego**

PROTAGONIST (as his ideal father): I am Peter's father. I never yell at him. I give him all the pocket money he needs, and he can do with it as he pleases. On occasion I take him to a football match. I leave him free, but I am available when he needs me. *Ideal-alter*

And what's very important, I express my emotions and admit my weaknesses. *Ideal-alter (outer/inner)*

DIRECTOR (to Peter as his ideal father): What do you think of Peter? **Question asked of protagonist as his auxiliary ego**

PROTAGONIST: I find him an able and courageous boy. Life is hard on him, what with his two sisters and a demanding father. But he'll manage. I do think he ought to spend his money less freely; that's something he still has to learn. He's all right, really. *Ideal meta-self*

DIRECTOR (to Peter as his ideal father): Be Peter again. **Deroling**

DIRECTOR (to Peter as himself): Look, there are your two fathers. You can talk to both of them, or to just one of them.

PROTAGONIST: I'll begin with Dad the way he is. **Dialogue—Confrontation self-image/alter-image**

There follows a dialogue in which Peter addresses his father. Peter, playing his own father, answers his own questions; alternately, he plays himself and his father. **Role reversal**

The dialogue ends with a violent argument.

PETER (to his father): You're a failure in every way!

DIRECTOR: Wait a minute, Peter. When you say that, what's going on inside you?

PROTAGONIST: I feel miserable. Time and time again I try to talk with him and time and time again it doesn't work through my own fault. I say nasty things that I don't mean to say. I just can't seem to express my positive feelings toward him. **Soliloquy—Self-image (outer/inner: externalization of inner thoughts and feelings)**

DIRECTOR: Here you can say what you feel, what you would like to say but can't. **Working with "surplus reality"**

PROTAGONIST: I can't. . . .

DIRECTOR: Just try; turn your head away from him, he can't hear you. Now speak to him. **Aside**

PROTAGONIST (hesitating): Dad, actually I don't mean what I said. I'd like to have a normal talk with you, without shouting and yelling. I'd like to go to a football match with you. **Self-image: (preparing transition from inner to outer)**

DIRECTOR: How does this feel?

PROTAGONIST: Fine. . . . It's what I would like things to be. **Ideal-self**

DIRECTOR: Become your father. (Peter becomes his father; his father becomes Peter.) **Role reversal**

ANTAGONIST (as Peter speaking to Peter in the role of his father): I'd like to go to a football match with you.

DIRECTOR (to Peter in the role of his father): How does it feel when your son tells you this? **Question asked of Peter in the role of antagonist**

PROTAGONIST (as his father): Strange, but all right. **Alter-image**
I had always hoped Peter would say this—I knew this moment would come. **Meta-self**

DIRECTOR: Change back again. (Peter becomes himself. Antagonist becomes father.) **Role Reversal**

The following further potential developments in the psychodrama serve as illustrations of the different levels in the personality dimensions.

CODIRECTOR (stands behind Peter and, in the role of Peter, says to father): Still, I am afraid of my positive feelings toward you, for they make me weaker, more feminine, feeble. **Therapeutic doubling by codirector—Self-image, possibly unconscious content (Figure 1, zone B)**

DIRECTOR (to protagonist): Is that possible?

PROTAGONIST: I hadn't thought of that. It could be. . . . **Unconscious content may move to conscious zone (Figure 1, B to A)**

DIRECTOR: Try to put it in your own words.

PROTAGONIST: I allow him to dominate me. I have no freedom at all. He always carries the day. **Soliloquy—Self-image, possibly with erroneous content (Figure 1, zone C)**

DIRECTOR (has Peter's previous scene repeated by the codirector as Peter and the antagonist as father, with Peter looking on): Peter may prove to have a lot of freedom; he is allowed to come home late, has lots of pocket money, girls. . . . **Mirroring—Possibly correction of unrealistic self-image (Figure 1, zone C moving to A)**

PROTAGONIST: Actually, I don't know my father. . . . **Alter-image, unknown content (Figure 1, zone E)**

CODIRECTOR (says, instead of Peter): Perhaps my father is jealous of me because he had no freedom at all when he was young. **Double**

PROTAGONIST: I don't know. He never told me anything about his youth, but it could be. Perhaps I may ask him how his father treated him. **Possibly reduction of unknown zone (Figure 1, zone E moving to A)**

DIRECTOR: There's somebody else standing there. **Integration—Alter-image/ideal-alter**

PROTAGONIST: Yes, my "ideal old man. . . ."

DIRECTOR: What do we do with him?

PROTAGONIST: Let him stand closer to my real dad. They don't differ all that much, really.

The examples show that psychodrama can work with very simple questions and techniques and with various dimensions and levels of the personality model. The important thing is that, in a dialectic way of thinking, the following rules (Verhofstadt-Denève, 1987) must be taken into account:

1. The subjective phenomenal constructions of the protagonist should be taken as the starting-point;

2. The intra-psychic contradictions (which also include our view of the others) described in the personality model should be made explicit, should be made to be appreciated;
3. The alternative interpretations should be stimulated and one should work toward (partial) integration.

Discussion

Considering man's self-reflective capacity, which enables him to experience himself simultaneously as subject (that reflects) and as object (on which reflection is made), I conceive the person as the knower (the I) and as the known (the me). This I-me activity gives rise to a rich confusion of self-images that are dialectically contrastive and equivalent; from these I have abstracted six phenomenal self-constructions.

Structurally, the self-image, the alter-image, and the meta-self all refer to the past, the present, and the future situations (lower half of Figure 1).

The ideal-self, the ideal-alter, and the ideal meta-self refer to the characteristics and conditions that one aspires to (or has aspired to) for one-self and for the others (upper half of Figure 1). The evaluation of the past, present, and future situations will be decisive for the construction of the desired self-dimensions. They can be compared to a kind of *infra-structure* continuously serving as the dynamic medium on which the *supra-structure* (the ideal images) thrives.

From the point of view of their content, each of the six self-constructions can refer to two more or less clearly defined fields, *personal characteristics* on the one hand and (existential) *conditions* on the other. Here we can also distinguish inner aspects (phenomenal reality) and outer aspects (forms of appearance), the content of which is sometimes very divergent. Our awareness of all these characteristics and conditions is not equally explicit. Some contents act exclusively at the level of the unconscious.

Our subjective construction of ourselves and of the world can be flawed by errors and deficiencies. We may perceive in ourselves and in others characteristics that we or they do not have. There are also characteristics that we or the others do have, but that we do not know at all, not even at the unconscious level. For this reason, I suggest that, along with the subjective phenomenal self-constructions, there are six "real" personality fields that do *not* include the erroneous (unrealistic) contents but *do* include the unknown contents. The delimitation of what is part of the erroneous or of the unknown zone is a hypothetical construct. It merely points out that a phenomenal construction is a *dynamic structure*; an active relation with a "real" material and social world enables corrections to be made and new elements to be integrated.

The totality of the personality structure I have thus outlined is obvi-

ously not present as an actuality in the child from the onset. The construction of the different dimensions of self will depend on progress in other personality fields, notably developing the ability for self-reflection and self-knowledge, for role taking, and for reflection upon "reality." These developments in their relation to the personality model outlined here are discussed in detail elsewhere (see Verhofstadt-Denève, 1987; Damon & Hart, 1982; Harter, 1983).

Many psychological theories convincingly emphasize the significance of growth toward awareness. The specific strategy employed to stimulate such awakening depends on the theoretical background and the personal style of the individual psychologist.

My own approach is based on existential-dialectic thinking, as applied to the phenomenal-dialectic personality model (Verhofstadt-Denève, 1987). I find the use of psychodrama techniques (inspired by the approach used by Moreno) to be particularly effective in activating the I-me dynamics that may actualize some of the interpsychic and intrapsychic contradictions within the me. The personality model described here has provided a useful working hypothesis concerning the nature of the contradictions at work. Psychodrama is not only a therapeutic technique. As a developmental psychologist, I regard psychodrama as a medium and a strategy that, through the subtle combination of speaking, thinking, feeling, and acting, can stimulate dialectic processes in the most divergent personality structures—even in those seemingly not under direct threat.

Of great importance is the question of the direction the process is taking. From the point of view of existential psychology, this is a question about the conditions in which the process of development evolves toward fulfillment of a person's potentialities in an atmosphere of existential freedom and growing independence and in a harmonious relationship with one's fellow human beings. It is essential to realize that this ideal can never be achieved, for it would imply the destruction of the dialectic process of development.

The extent to which all this paves the way for specific therapeutic action cannot be dealt with here. Elsewhere, in a wider context, I have tried to characterize psychodrama as being inherently dialectic, not only with regard to its effects and its internal workings, but also as to the basic techniques used.

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DR. VERHOFSTADT-DENÈVE is a psychodrama trainer and professor of developmental and personality psychology at the University of Ghent, Belgium.

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Address:

Dr. Leni M. F. Verhofstadt-Denève

Department of Psychology

Henri Dunantlaan, 2

B-9000 Ghent, Belgium

Correction: In the previous issue, captions on Figures 2 and 3 in the article by Passariello and Newnes were reversed. Figure 2 on page 175 should read: Socio-gram of Negative Choices. The correct caption for Figure 3 on page 176 is Socio-gram of Positive Choices.

The editor regrets the error and the inconvenience it has caused.

Closure in Psychodrama

PETER FELIX KELLERMANN

ABSTRACT. This paper attempts to define the closure concept in psychodrama, to discuss its therapeutic purposes, and to describe some common examples of closure scenes. It is suggested that closure be regarded not only as the final act in the drama employed to achieve termination, but also as an opportunity for personal growth inducing transition to a new beginning.

FINIS CORONA OPUS; the end crowns the production. The end of a successful psychodramatic production often includes a suitable scene that terminates the drama in a fulfilling manner. This scene is the high point of the session, completing the action by providing a sense of closure for the protagonist and for the group.

Such a scene is generally described as a *closure scene* and is of special importance when conceptualizing the therapeutic process of psychodrama. But closure has been largely neglected in major textbooks. Though various other aspects, such as the warm-up process, have been discussed at length, comparatively little has been written about closure. As a result, our understanding of the closure aspect and of the termination phase of psychodrama remains rather limited.

The purpose of this paper is to define the closure concept in psychodrama and to discuss its therapeutic purposes. In addition, and in consideration of the technical challenge that closure presents to all psychodrama practitioners, some common closure scenes will be described briefly.

The Concept of Closure

The word closure is not an original psychodramatic concept and, as far as I know, it does not appear in any of Moreno's writings. "Closure" may have entered the vocabulary of psychodrama from gestalt psychology or gestalt therapy. Within these fields it is used to describe the process in perception and personality organization, where an integrated and whole gestalt is completed.

Currently, the word closure is used in psychodrama from two different points of view.

From the point of view of drama, closure is used simply to describe the final scene in a psychodrama. It is the stopping place of the action on stage, before the postaction sharing phase. As such, closure is regarded as the grand finale, the culmination of a drama. It becomes a "staging problem for the director, who attempts to end the drama in an aesthetically pleasing way" (Warner, 1975, p. 9).

From the point of view of psychotherapy, closure is used to describe a kind of intrapsychic conclusion for the protagonist. As such, it represents the maturation of a healing process, the final station in a therapeutic journey, and the goal of a session, ideally giving a feeling of emotional relief and a sense of therapeutic progress. It is in this termination phase of psychodrama therapy that the definite work of resolution is done.

Such resolution is important not only for the protagonist, but also for the auxiliary egos, the group, and the director. The auxiliary egos may find closure in role feedback and deroling. The group may find closure in the identification and ventilation aspects of the sharing phase. Furthermore, the director may also achieve closure after the session during the processing phase of psychodrama.

Intrapsychic closure may occur not only during the action part of the session, but at any time after the session. Such closure implies that there is no absolute end to the therapeutic process as such. As one session leads to the other, it is misleading to speak of any definite intrapsychic conclusions. On the contrary, the protagonist will experience continued change after a successful psychodrama session and, it is hoped, continue to reintegrate new growth experiences all through life.

The principles of closure may be illustrated by the psychodrama of Paula (pseudonym, of course). Paula was going to get married but felt uncomfortable with certain aspects of the relationship with her boyfriend. She had adopted a self-sufficient attitude toward him that led to an inability to ask him in times of need to take care of her. Tracing her feelings back to childhood revealed a number of similar situations in which Paula had become her own "parent" during her mother's depressions. Remembering those situations from the past brought out a flood of pent-up feelings and revealed largely unsatisfied dependency needs from childhood. After having reached some emotional release (and with the awareness that she was reenacting an old script from the past), she was prepared to confront her boyfriend again, this time in a more mature and satisfying manner.

Here, the psychodrama of Paula could have ended. But the director felt that there was a need to enact another, final scene that would close

the session in a more therapeutic fashion. Hence, the director suggested a closure scene in which each group member was instructed to "be" Paula and to empathize with her original problem. Paula was then asked to be her own therapist and tell each of those doubles what to do to change the old role of being a strong and undemanding "parent" in the future. In role reversal, Paula listened as each group member repeated her words to them. This scene closed the drama, and the director invited the group to share with Paula.

Adding this closure scene to the others in Paula's psychodrama was important for several reasons. First, the closure scene initiated a therapeutic process that went beyond mere catharsis and insight as these were translated into behavioral action. Further, by exploring the possibilities for such actions in the future, the closure scene provoked an actual real-life confrontation to be done by the protagonist after the psychodrama outside the therapeutic setting. Second, by giving Paula the role of her own therapist, she was faced with the final responsibility for deciding what to do in the future. Finally, by involving the other group members actively in Paula's problem, the scene facilitated sharing and helped Paula return to the group.

Very little has been written about closure in the literature of psychodrama and role playing. Perhaps the best-known text is the paper on "sum-up" by Weiner & Sacks (1969). Sum-up is a form of closure that recapitulates, in a succinct form, high points of a session. Barbour (1977) emphasizes the closure aspect involved in psychodramatic sharing. Another conceptualization of closure is presented by Levy (1969), who describes how people warm up to emotional and subjective involvement in role playing and how they later "warm down" to a level of objectivity and noninvolvement. This kind of thinking is based on the simplified view of protagonists who "warm up" or "open up" in the beginning of the session and later "cool down" or "close down" at the end. This "switch-on-switch-off" attitude toward feelings is erroneous and misleading, and it does not enrich our understanding of closure patterns.

It is more productive to describe closure as the end of a therapeutic process. Typically, classical psychodrama progresses through the various stages of warm up, action, closure, and sharing as illustrated by, for example, a normal curve (Hollander, 1969), a spiral (Goldman & Morrison, 1984), or a feeling cycle (Hart, Corriere, & Binder, 1975). Closure constitutes the termination phase of this process.

Another conceptualization of closure as a specific phase in the therapeutic process of psychodrama is given by Schramski (1979), who mentions the portion of role training that seems to be a kind of closure because it occurs after action but before sharing. Similarly, Petzold (1978)

describes a behavior modification closure phase that he calls "new-orientation"; it is introduced after the diagnostic-anamnestic and the psychocathartic phases but occurs before the final feedback phase of psychodrama.

If we regard psychodrama in such process terms as a journey of mind through life, closure may be thought of either as a final destination, like arriving at the top of a mountain where everything is visibly clear, or as returning to the starting point, completing a full circle. An example of the latter closure strategy is the reenactment of the first scene at the end of the session. Such psychodramas often begin with one or more scenes from the here and now, proceed to scenes from the there and then, and finally return to a closure scene in the here and now. This strategy is in agreement with the recommendation of Zerka T. Moreno (1965) that sessions should proceed "from the periphery to the center," and that a session should come "full circle back to the present" (Goldman & Morrison, 1984, p. 27).

When closure is absent or insufficient, the protagonist is left with an uncomfortable feeling of unrest. This feeling can be likened to the sense of suddenly waking up from the middle of some dramatic dream before its natural ending. With regard to psychodrama, such a lack of closure calls for a continuation in a new session in which the protagonist is given sufficient time to finish the process and reach action-completion.

At what point has closure been achieved? According to Warner (1975), "closure has been achieved when there are not too many loose ends, and when both protagonist and group sense a completion, even though the final statement may specify unresolved tensions and future directions" (p. 9).

Therapeutic Purposes of Closure Scenes

Closure scenes are used by directors for specific purposes. According to Goldman & Morrison (1984), one purpose for using a closure scene is to conclude the psychodrama "on a high note or some other positive possibility" (p. 31). According to Warner (1975), the closure scene prevents protagonists from being left "high and dry" (p. 9), helping them to regain emotional balance and control before leaving the psychodrama stage. Some of the other general purposes of closure scenes and termination strategies may be to

1. complete a therapeutic cycle;
2. provide symbolic or real satisfaction;
3. neutralize regression and transference;
4. make separation a genuine maturational event;

5. transform surplus reality into "common" reality;
6. bring about a cognitive reorganization or reevaluation of emotional experiences from the session;
7. provide behavioral learning for the future;
8. facilitate the return to the outer world of day-to-day responsibilities;
9. evoke optimism and hope.

A major controversy regarding closure is the use of so-called happy endings, which are sometimes introduced in order to provide wish fulfillment at the end of the session. Advocates of such endings claim that they are helpful in evoking a sense of optimism and hope, giving protagonists a good feeling as they leave the stage, providing some light at the end of a dark tunnel. Critics, however, dispute these benefits or deny them completely. They claim that overjoyed closure scenes tend to distort reality by emphasizing only the positive aspects; they argue that without any fundamental growth process experienced by the protagonist, the progress must be regarded as only superficial. Advocates of happy endings acknowledge the imaginary aspects of some closure scenes but assert that people need dreams to cope with life in the same way as children (and some adults) find consolation in the classical happy endings of literature. Critics feel that such endings deceive the protagonist into accepting illusions rather than coping with reality.

It is my feeling that a "happy" closure scene may have its therapeutic value as well as its aesthetic charm, especially by demonstrating how conflicts may be successfully resolved and thus arousing hope for the future. However, I do not think that all sessions must be terminated on an optimistic tone. Some psychodramas that end like fairy tales, with the protagonist hero riding off into the sunset after a "perfect victory," giving the illusion of living happily ever after, are awkward if there has been no significant working through of conflicts. It may be more productive in such cases to introduce a closure scene in which the protagonist recognizes unresolved conflicts, faces difficult situations, or anticipates an uncertain future. Such closure scenes are open ended, signifying that life itself is open to unforeseen occurrences and that there are no guarantees of future happiness. This thinking assumes that there are no perfect psychodrama sessions, only more or less honest and human ones.

Closure scenes that are productive for one protagonist may be useless for another; each protagonist needs to conclude in a most personal manner according to the specific therapeutic journey he or she has embarked upon. Here are some examples. Sarah ended her psychodrama with a joyful, spontaneous dance. Jill's closure was explosive, putting an end to her alcoholism by smashing bottles and throwing them away. Paul ended his psychodrama sitting in the lap of an auxiliary who was enacting the

role of his father. Li gave a speech to the group, asserting her own right to choose what to do with her life. Tom went around the group asking how people felt about him after he had revealed his secret.

Achieving suitable personal closure scenes demands understanding not only of the psychological apparatus of the individual protagonists, but also of the specific healing experiences that are required for each person in order to make progress. Some protagonists need symbolic need fulfillment, others forgiveness from guilt, concrete suggestions for the future, or new experiences that plant seeds of trust and hope. Finding such appropriate closure scenes is one of the major challenges that faces every director of psychodrama.

Examples of Closure Scenes in Psychodrama

Ideally, closure scenes evolve naturally from the drama and are then initiated by the protagonists themselves. If this does not happen, the director may suggest such a scene on the basis of earlier experience and clues from the drama. Twenty-six common examples of closure scenes taken from the literature and from my own experience are described briefly here.

Action Completion. The protagonist is encouraged to complete his or her phantasies; to do what was left undone and to undo what was done (Z. T. Moreno, 1965).

Audience Analyst. A group member sums up reactions from the audience about a psychodrama (Weiner & Sacks, 1969).

Award Experience. The protagonist is given an award and is encouraged to give a speech to the group (Weiner & Sacks, 1969).

Concretization. Used by Goldman & Morrison (1984) to describe a closure scene in which "all threads of a session come together" (p. 31) by making a situation concrete and tangible.

Conflict Solving. A scene is enacted in which a balance is found between at least two inner tendencies that are in conflict with one another.

Correction. A corrective scene is enacted in which, for example, crime or injustice is admitted and forgiven.

Epilogue. Retrospective analysis of the past in light of how things actually turned out.

Final Dialogue. The protagonist has a final talk with a significant person from his or her life.

Future Work. The protagonist plans for future sessions, for example, with the help of empty chairs, each signifying an unresolved problem. Another variety of this closure is to plan and give homework assignments to be done by the protagonist after the session.

Future Projection. A continuation of life is anticipated. One example would be the enactment of an imagined situation 10 years from now (Z. T. Moreno, 1965).

Grand Finale. The protagonist finally renounces, forgives, or gives a clear statement "on stage" to a large group of significant others.

Group Choice. Various endings suggested by the group.

Happy Endings. A scene is enacted that presents a situation of wish fulfillment, love, or triumphant victory.

Leave-Taking Ritual. The protagonist is instructed to separate from a significant person with the help of a ritual such as writing farewell letters and then burning them (Van der Hart, 1981).

Open Endings. The drama is deliberately left uncompleted in order to provoke future action and continued working through after the session. Like a book with chapters to fill, never-ending, open-ended psychodramas emphasize how life proceeds through continuous experiences and cycles that go beyond any single phase and therefore never reaches a final end point.

Reenactment. The protagonist reenacts the first or any other significant scene from the psychodrama in a new or different way.

Relaxation. Protagonist and group members are given a moment of physical relaxation with suitable music at the end of the session.

Re-parenting. The protagonist is exposed to group members who enact the roles of good parents who hold and take care of him or her in a new way, thus providing a corrective emotional experience.

Role Training. The protagonist trains how to enact various roles and how to behave in difficult situations.

Separation. The protagonist says good-bye to a person or to the group as a whole.

Sum Up. Director and protagonist recapitulate the process and the scenes from the psychodrama (Weiner & Sacks, 1969) or give a summary of what has gone on (Blatner, 1973).

Support. Each person in the group tells the protagonist something he or she likes about the protagonist (Blatner, 1973).

Surplus Reality. A phantasy scene is enacted to express symbolic material, for example, the voice of God declaring that everything will be all right.

Symphony. The group produces an orchestration of the social atom (Warner, 1975).

Take a Picture. An actual or imagined picture is taken of the final scene (Warner, 1975).

Thanksgiving Gift. The protagonist gives a symbolic or real parting gift to the group or receives a gift from them.

While the scenes mentioned above may help describe common termination strategies and universal closural patterns, they cannot substitute for the creative use of specific endings in each unique psychodrama. The success of a psychodramatic endeavor depends on the artistic flexibility of the director. Any mechanization of technique leading to predictable closures, therefore, is entirely out of place.

Conclusion: Beyond Closure

Consummatum est. La commedia e finita. The psychodrama is done, finished, and over; actions are completed; tears are shed; wounds are healed; and the past is a part of forever. Another cycle of life is closed. However, while closure terminates the therapeutic journey on stage, it should not be regarded as an absolute end. In the words of Merlyn Pitzele (personal communication, 1987), "Strictly speaking there is no such thing as closure save death. What we want is transition in which we hold on to what we have been through but get on with our lives." In the final analysis, the ultimate purpose of closure in psychodrama is to extend the drama beyond its natural end and induce a transition to a new beginning. If properly understood and managed, psychodramatic closure conveys the truism that something ends and then begins again and again and again. That's about the only thing we can be sure of.

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PETER FELIX KELLERMANN is a psychologist in private practice in Israel and also works with the Jerusalem Center for Psychodrama and Group Work.

Date of submission:

December 21, 1987

Date of final acceptance:

April 1, 1988

Address:

Peter Felix Kellermann

5 Mapu Street

Jerusalem 94189

Israel

Information for Authors

The *Journal of Group Psychotherapy, Psychodrama and Sociometry* publishes manuscripts that deal with the application of group psychotherapy, psychodrama, sociometry, role playing, life skills training, and other action methods to the fields of psychotherapy, counseling, and education. Preference will be given to articles dealing with experimental research and empirical studies. The journal will continue to publish reviews of the literature, case reports, and action techniques. Theoretical articles will be published if they have practical application. Theme issues will be published from time to time.

The journal welcomes practitioners' short reports of approximately 500 words. This brief reports section is devoted to descriptions of new techniques, clinical observations, results of small surveys and short studies.

The Differential Effect of Role-Playing Conditions on the Accuracy of Self-Evaluation

DAVID A. KIPPER

ABSTRACT. The hypothesis that different kinds of role-playing situations affect the accuracy of evaluating one's own behavior as shown through videotape feedback was tested. Two groups of 15 subjects each participated in a role-playing episode, one conducted under a mimetic-pretend condition and the other under a spontaneous condition. The results confirmed the prediction that subjects in the former group will produce more accurate self-evaluations than those in the latter group.

IN A RECENTLY PUBLISHED BOOK, psychodramatic interventions were formulated along a model described as the behavior simulation paradigm (Kipper, 1986). One of the aims of this new conceptualization was to position psychodrama in a wider frame of reference, that is, as a part of a growing area known as simulated experiences, thus providing a bridge between interventions, which stems from Moreno's theory and other applications of role-playing procedures. Traditionally, role-playing research suffered from unhealthy compartmentalization where each set of interventions was analyzed in the context of the particular theoretical approach in which it had been applied. The new paradigm offered a common language—shared concepts—for comparing the characteristics and the effects of various role-playing interventions, regardless of their theoretical origin.

Furthermore, the paradigm opened an additional avenue for conducting psychodrama research. Historically, outcome studies regarding the effects of psychodrama were characterized by the following approaches: (a) an approach where the effectiveness of the entire treatment package with specific clientele (or specific problems) was measured along the before-and-after research design, (b) a similar approach where the effectiveness of the entire treatment package was compared to other kinds of

treatment, and (c) an approach characterized by measuring the impact of specific psychodramatic techniques such as the Double (e.g., Hudgins & Kiesler, 1987) or the Role Reversal (e.g., Johnson, 1971). The new formulation facilitated a more generic research (with a considerable specificity) concerning the basic elements of role playing. Indeed, since the publication of its earlier version (Kipper, 1982), the paradigm stimulated a number of studies.

The paradigm identified three distinct "pure" elements described as simulation conditions. One, labeled a spontaneous condition, involved players who portrayed themselves in their own identities. The second, a mimetic-pretend condition, involved players who assumed the identity of someone else, typically someone they did not know personally. The third was called a mimetic-replication condition and involved role playing the behavior of a vividly visible model. It was claimed that each of these conditions tended to activate different psychological processes. The present study was designed to investigate this claim with regard to the first two of the above three conditions—the spontaneous and the mimetic-pretend—relative to their differential effect on the accuracy of self-evaluation.

Evaluating one's own behavior was already the subject of role-playing research. For example, distortions in self-evaluation through videotape feedback were found to be related to personality variables, whereas distortions in evaluating someone else were not (Kipper & Ginot, 1979). The role plays for which the self-evaluations were made fell into the spontaneous category. In another study (Kipper & Har-Even, 1984), mimetic-pretend subjects appeared to display a greater impartiality than spontaneous subjects in evaluating the responsibility for their success. The implied impartiality was thought to be attributable to the fact that mimetic-pretend conditions created an emotional distance between the self, on the one hand, and the performance under the new identity, on the other. These two results suggested that involvement in the spontaneous condition was associated with increased subjectivity. Therefore, it was predicted that self-evaluations based on mimetic-pretend portrayals would be more accurate than self-evaluations based on enactments under a spontaneous condition.

Method

Subjects

Thirty undergraduate students who were enrolled in an introduction to psychology course served as subjects in an investigation described as an experiment concerning role-playing behavior. The group consisted of 15

males and 15 females who expressed readiness to take part in the study as a partial fulfillment of their course requirement. The subjects were accepted on the basis of voluntary choice and, other than limiting the participants to 30 and specifying an equal number of males and females, there were no specific criteria for inclusion. The age of those who subsequently participated ranged from 20 to 27 years.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable was the difference between the participants' evaluations of their own role-playing behavior, shown through a videotape replay, and the evaluations of the same behavior by two independent judges. The evaluations were made on the basis of a short version of a Behavior Evaluation Form (BEF). The original BEF (Kipper & Ginot, 1979) was a structured assessment checklist containing 23 brief descriptions of behavioral characteristics. These were presented in pairs of opposites on a 5-point scale with scores ranging from 1 to 5. The descriptions included in the original BEF pertained to three aspects of behavior: general appearance, mode of verbal communication, and candor in expressing feelings and attitudes. Examples of items addressing these aspects follow: In your judgment, did you appear excited and interested or apathetic and uninterested? In your judgment, was the way you spoke clear and expansive or hesitant and brief? In presenting your case, was your behavior bashful or confident? The order of phrasing the descriptions was altered occasionally, i.e., first positive then negative and vice versa, to avoid response set. In the original BEF, the interrater reliability for the evaluations of three judges for each pair yielded product-moment correlations ranging from .83 to .87. The shortened version included 13 of the original descriptions deemed relevant to the role-playing episode portrayed in the present study.

Procedure

The 30 subjects were randomly divided into two equal groups of seven or eight males and seven or eight females each. One was designed to serve as a spontaneous condition group and the other as a mimetic-pretend group, following the categorization proposed in the behavior simulation paradigm (Kipper, 1986).

Thus, participants assigned to the spontaneous condition were asked to role play a scene as themselves. On the other hand, those assigned to the mimetic-pretend condition were asked to enact the same role-playing

scene under a new, assumed identity. Pre-test trials revealed that assuming the identity of a graduate student (i.e., someone four to five years older than the subjects), of the opposite sex, who was also given a new male or female name, was an appropriate role definition that elicited a sense of detachment from one's own identity to create a feeling of being someone else.

The role-playing scene portrayed by all the subjects in their respective group affiliation was the same used in an earlier study (Kipper & Ginot, 1979). It was one of two short 10-minute situations selected from a larger list of situations by six independent undergraduate students for its appropriateness in terms of (a) pertinence to student's life, (b) relative simplicity, (c) goal orientation, and (d) involvement of a mild degree of stress. The situation, labeled a meeting with your professor, was described to each participant as follows:

You have just received the results of a midterm examination, for which you studiously prepared yourself, and found that the grade was much lower than you expected. You have decided to request a meeting with your professor to persuade him to allow you to take the exam again hoping that this time your work will be upgraded. The meeting is about to take place, and at this moment, you are standing in front of your professor's office. Knock on the door and go in.

The office for the scene included the professor's chair and a desk with books and scattered papers on it and one or two other chairs to be used by visitors. A trained person portrayed the professor and was coached to perform the role in the same manner for each subject. He practiced the questions and remarks and adopted a style of behavior that included a sequence of responses that began with receptiveness, shifted to probing and argumentation, and ended with warmth.

The experimental procedure was as follows: Upon entering the room, each subject received an oral description of the role-playing situation and was then instructed to portray the scene either as himself/herself or as the prescribed new identity. The ensuing portrayal was videotaped with the knowledge and consent of the player. About 5 minutes later, the subject was shown a videotape of this performance and was asked to evaluate it on the short version of the BEF. The videotaped scene was shown, at a different time, to the two judges who made their own independent evaluations, using the same rating instrument.

Results and Discussion

The results of the interraters' agreement for the items included in the short version yielded product-moment correlations ranging from .69 to

.94 with an average correlation coefficient of .79. Therefore, it was decided to combine the two judges' ratings and use the average as one score.

The degree of accuracy of the evaluations was defined as the dissimilarity between the participant's ratings of his/her videotaped role play on the 13 items BEF and the average ratings of the judges on the same items. This produced a discrepancy score, that is, the algebraic sum of the differences between the score of the raters and that of the participant.

The computation of the discrepancy scores for subjects in the spontaneous and the mimetic-pretend groups resulted in $M = 0.80$, $SD = 0.40$ and $M = .20$, $SD = 0.26$, respectively. A t -test analysis showed that the difference between the two groups was statistically significant: $t(28) = 4.95$, $p < .001$. Subjects in the spontaneous condition, who evaluated their behavior under their own identity, were less accurate than those in the mimetic-pretend condition, who evaluated their behavior under an assumed identity.

The obtained differential effect of the two role-playing conditions appeared to lend further credence to the proposition that advocated a separation among several categories of simulated experiences. It also seemed congruent with the rationale claiming that each category constituted a different phenomenological state that might activate different psychological process(es).

The mimetic-pretend roles used in the present study seemed typical of those subsumed by the auxiliaries, either when enacted for the sole benefit of the protagonist or when enacted for their own benefit as an opportunity to expand their personal role repertoire. Similar to the portrayals of the graduate student, the roles of the auxiliaries usually fell into two broad categories: (a) those depicting an unfamiliar person (but who was typically known to the protagonist) on the basis of sketchy descriptions given to them and (b) those portraying a socially recognizable role that had a consensual normative characteristic, e.g., a good friend, a loving mother. A suggested implication of the present investigation is that reflecting on one's own performance in the role of an auxiliary is likely to result in a greater accuracy than evaluating self-performance in roles where the player's self-identity is preserved.

Finally, it might be appropriate to speculate about the reason(s) that the mimetic-pretend condition elicited more accurate self-evaluations. Previous studies on the effects of mimetic-pretend suggested that it tended to be associated with impartial judgments (Kipper & Har-Even, 1984) and with an elevated cognitive activity (Kipper & Uspiz, 1987). These might create a psychological distancing and hence a greater accuracy of the evaluation. The indication for the plausibility of such an explanation

notwithstanding, a substantiation of the direct relationship between mimetic-pretend and impartial judgments (or distancing) still awaits further empirical evidence.

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DAVID KIPPER is an associate professor at the Department of Psychology, Bar-Ilan University, Israel.

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Address:
David A. Kipper, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
Bar-Ilan University
Ramat-Gan 52100, Israel

BRIEF REPORT

Practical Help for the Practitioner

DAN ESTES

Facing a group of patients on a medical detox unit is almost always a trying challenge. On the unit where I conduct psychodrama, the range of patient life experience is extraordinary. For example, a 20-year-old woman may be in her first detox after using crack for only 6 months. Next to her may sit a man in his late fifties with an IV hooked to his arm as he goes through his eighth inpatient alcohol detox. In one hour, I am called upon to work with this group in such a manner that I help them address their addictions in a therapeutic fashion. They are physically ill, angry, depressed, hopeful, and frightened, while usually they are outwardly showing gruff denial.

Psychodramatists are called upon to be spontaneous, but we are also frequently searching for helpful exercises we can incorporate into our therapeutic repertoire. Techniques and exercises learned from others are fine, if we fit the technique to the situations we encounter and not the other way around.

Over time, among the interventions that I have found effective in breaking through defenses is the linking of patients' addiction experiences to their social atoms. One way I do this, following introductions, is by directing the group to think of the people in their lives who have been affected most by their addiction.

Some patients have gone so far into their addictions that the nearest they come to a current social atom is the group they drink with on the street. They must go into the past to pick a significant person. Among the most frequent choices are mother, young children, and spouses, and it is not uncommon for a deceased family member to be the choice.

After asking the group to identify mentally the people, other than themselves, affected by their addiction, I then request that they pick the one person most affected. The difficulty in limiting this selection to one can be overcome by explaining that for this exercise patients can mentally flip a coin to choose between two important people. Sometimes patients feel that limiting the choice to one does others in their social atoms further harm.

After narrowing down to the one person most harmed by this addiction, I have clients confront the person through a brief, guided fantasy in

which they imagine themselves facing the person. This internal psychodrama encounter is conducted so that the patients experience the person using their sense memories. The patients are directed to hear, smell, see, and observe the motions and expressions of the person they have chosen as that person talks to them about their addiction. The group leader will need to adapt these instructions to fit the style and the needs of a particular group. The leader may find it difficult to walk the line between expecting too little or too much from a group, having worked with it for only a few minutes. For example, the leader may find that, despite clear instructions, at least one in the group will choose himself or herself.

Patients set their own level of involvement, and this can be an intense exercise for those who allow it to be. In the sharing, it becomes apparent who is most able to work further and also carry the interest of most of the others in the group. Each patient in turn is asked to identify the person chosen and repeat what was said. Because of the limited time, this is kept brief. Depending on the timing and the intensity and a dozen unknowns, one or more patients then encounter, via empty chair, the persons chosen in the exercise. The director may wish to have one patient develop a brief psychodrama rather than have many doing a series of empty chair encounters. Other patients or a staff member may play the role of the person the patient has chosen from his or her social atom. Establishing the connection between the addiction, the patient, and the relationship with the person in the patient's social atom is the goal.

Not infrequently, the patient experiences the love and the hope that had been offered by the person most hurt and finds support for his or her efforts. At other times, reactions are complicated, with anger, hurt, and blame among the issues to be dealt with. Nearly always, the patients express anger at their addiction and what it has done to their lives and to the ones they love.

The closure/sharing is as important in this brief group experience as in any other psychodrama. It may be necessary for the director to help members draw connections between the hurt persons from their social atom and other patients. Often the responses of the many undereducated and severely addicted patients, who articulate their issues in a profound and powerful manner as a result of a psychodramatic encounter, can be overwhelming to the director and other members of the group. Those in the group are often brought closer together and move toward a mutually supportive interaction after completing this exercise.

DAN ESTES is a Philadelphia psychodramatist who can be reached at 2004 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103.

BOOK REVIEW

TITLE: *The Evolution of Psychotherapy*

AUTHOR: Jeffrey K. Zeig, Editor

DATE: 1987

PUBLISHER: Brunner/Mazel, New York

PRICE: \$50.

This book reflects a landmark event in the history of psychotherapy, a convocation of over 27 major leaders in the field, many of whom had never previously met each other. The conference was held in December 1985, in Phoenix, Arizona, and was attended by more than 7,000 mental health professionals representing every discipline. It was sponsored by the Milton H. Erickson Foundation, which is appropriate because Erickson's hypnotherapeutic approach has been used in many disciplines in the field of psychotherapy during the last decade. To my knowledge, conferences with this degree of eclecticism were last sponsored by J. L. Moreno in the mid-1960s. Since that time, the idea of eclecticism has gradually become more respectable and more theoretically well grounded (Norcross, 1986; Beutler, 1983).

The title of the conference—the same as that of the book—appropriately reflected the nature of this project, not so much by its speakers, who mainly presented their own views, but more by the audience of mental health professionals, who were clearly involved in their own journeys of synthesis. The organizers of the conference facilitated this process by offering a wide variety of settings for the presentations. These ranged from large-scale demonstration sessions to smaller conversation hours and panels in which four representatives of diverse schools of thought could address a common theme. The listing of major speakers makes an impressive point about the nature and quality of the event (Table 1).

Jeffrey Zeig, as conference chairman, has assembled from the conference important current expositions by all of these leaders. The breadth of this book is such that it will become a major text for survey courses in contemporary practice of psychotherapy. The only other book of this stature is the well-known series, *Current Psychotherapies*, edited by R. J. Corsini (1979, 1983). These two books complement each other, one covering areas missed by the other. Several approaches, including Adlerian, transper-

TABLE 1
Conference Speakers and Subjects

Speaker	Subject
Aaron Beck	Cognitive Psychotherapy
Bruno Bettelheim	Psychoanalysis, Therapeutic Milieu
Murray Bowen	Family Therapy
Albert Ellis	Rational-Emotive Therapy
Robert and Mary Goulding	Transactional Analysis, Redecision
Jay Haley	Interactional, Strategic Therapy
R. D. Laing	Radical Therapy
Arnold Lazarus	Multimodal Psychotherapy
Cloe Madanes	Family Therapy
Judd Marmor	New Directions in Psychoanalysis
James Masterson	Object Relations Theory
Rollo May	Existential Psychology
Salvador Minuchin	Family Therapy
Zerka Moreno	Psychodrama, Role Theory
Erving and Miriam Polster	Gestalt Therapy
Carl Rogers	Client-Centered Therapy
Ernest Rossi	Psychosomatics and Ericksonian Hypnotherapy
Virginia Satir	Family Therapy
Thomas Szasz	The Politics of Psychiatry
Paul Watzlawick	Systems Theory, Family Therapy
Carl Whitaker	Family Therapy
Joseph Wolpe	Reciprocal Inhibition, Behavior Therapy
Lewis Wolberg	Hypnotherapy, Future Trends
Jeffrey Zeig	Theory of Ericksonian Hypnotherapy

sonal, or bioenergetic therapies, were not addressed by the conference.

Zerka Moreno's chapter on "Psychodrama, Role Theory, and the Concept of the Social Atom" is a clear and informative presentation. She has been devoting more time to teaching in the last several years, so this is a welcome formulation of her most current thinking.

The Evolution of Psychotherapy offers distilled ideas reflecting the latest thinking of many leaders from the broad spectrum of major therapeutic approaches. Since most agree that it is fundamentally important

for mental health professionals to know the varieties of points of view, this book could serve as a beginning text for every therapist.

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ADAM BLATNER is the director of consultation at the University of Louisville School of Medicine. He can be reached at the Bingham Child Guidance Clinic, 200 E. Chestnut Street, Louisville, KY 40202.

Protection for the Mentally Ill

Principles, Guidelines, and Guarantees for the Protection of Persons Detained on Grounds of Mental Ill-Health or Suffering from Mental Disorder, a United Nations report, endeavors to contribute to the protection of the fundamental freedoms and the human and legal rights of persons who are mentally ill or suffering from mental disorder, the abolition of psychiatric abuses, the promotion of mental health law and medical practice, and the improvement of mental health care and mental institutions. The report was prepared by Erica-Irene A. Daes under the auspices of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The report (#E.85.XIV.9—\$7.00) is available at bookstores and from the United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

Letter to the Editor

Concerning the "Bibliography of the work of J. L. Moreno" compiled by A. Paul Hare in JGPPS 3 (1986), I wish to make the following remarks.

This bibliography is very exhaustive but is not "the complete work," as claimed on page 96. The statement, "no previously published list of his work indicates the connections between many of his publications," is incorrect. The Petzold and Mathias book, *Rollenentwicklung und Identität—Von den Anfängen der Rollentheorie zum sozialpsychiatrischen Rollenkonzept Morenos* (Junfermann Verlag, Paderborn 1982), published a nearly complete list of Moreno's publications. In both lists, Hare's and Petzold and Mathias', there are some minor omissions. In Hare's bibliography, however, many prefaces to German books on psychodrama and a number of translations of articles are not listed. Moreover, I see severe problems in Hare's bibliography with the sections concerning the early writing from 1908 to 1925. Here a number of errors are due to the fact that Hare apparently has not seen the original publications. It would have been worthwhile to consult the originals where one would have discovered that Moreno was one of the owners, along with Alfred Adler, of the "Genossenschaftsverlag" in Vienna, Prague, and Leipzig. One would have noticed that *Das Stegreiftheater* was published in 1924 and not 1923, although Moreno himself quoted it generally with this date. I have not been able to trace a single copy of this book with indication of 1923, but I was able to find four original copies in various German and Austrian libraries, all dated 1924. The book apparently was written in 1923 and printed in the following year. I must conclude that for the years from 1913 to 1925 the bibliography I have compiled is more complete than Hare's.

For a Moreno bibliographer, it is hard to get copies and photocopies of the material. A major problem is that in Moreno's own writings there are a lot of misquotations of his own early work concerning publishing houses, years, and titles. Authors have accepted these and other bibliographical sources without verifying the indications with the original publication. In the original publications from the *Verlag des Vaters*, titles are indicated that apparently never appeared and cannot be traced in the libraries and in the publication list of Gustav Kiepenheuer Verlag. For these reasons, I am trying to find a publisher for the early writings of J. L. Moreno because these represent a valuable contribution to the history of expressionistic literature and theater.

Hilarion Petzold, Ph.D.

Chair of Clinical Movement Therapy
Free University of Amsterdam

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The pioneering membership organization in group psychotherapy, the American Society of Group Psychotherapy and Psychodrama, founded by J. L. Moreno, M.D., in April 1942, has been the source and inspiration of the later developments in this field. It sponsored and made possible the organization of the International Association on Group Psychotherapy. It also made possible a number of international congresses of group psychotherapy. Membership includes subscription to *The Journal of Group Psychotherapy, Psychodrama & Sociometry* founded in 1947 by J. L. Moreno, the first journal devoted to group psychotherapy in all its forms.

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